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SUMMARYEurope’s labour and social institutions need urgent reform if
we are to grasp the opportunities offered by globalisation and avoid the
threats. But the notion of a single “European Social Model” is largely
unhelpful for thinking about reforms. Of the four main models 
operating, the “Nordic” and the “Anglo-Saxon” models are both 
efficient, but only the former manages to combine both equity and
efficiency. Critically, the “Continental” and “Mediterranean” models,
which together account for two-thirds of the GDP of the entire EU-25
and 90 per cent of the GDP of the 12-member eurozone, are inefficient
and unsustainable.These models must therefore be reformed, probably
by adopting features of the two more efficient models. These reforms
may also involve changes towards more or less equity.
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POLICY CHALLENGE
Combining reforms of product and capital markets 
at the EU level and of labour market and social policies
at national levels would be desirable, particularly
within the euro area. So far the Lisbon Agenda has 
failed to deliver this coordination. At present the best
policy strategy to follow would be for the EU to go back
to basics and focus all efforts on completing the Single
Market. At the same time, Member States requiring
most urgent reform of their labour and social policies
must take internal action. Failing to do would not only
run the risk that Europe misses the opportunities of 
globalisation, but could even be damaging to both 
the Single Market and monetary union.
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1. EUROPEAN RENEWAL
The Constitutional stalemate and fai-
lure to agree changes to the budget
have spawned a new and open debate
on the future of the European Union.
In his speech to the European
Parliament on 23 June, incoming
Council President Tony Blair said that
he believed in Europe as a political
project that offered its citizens strong
social protection. But he
also warned that Europe
needed a "social Europe
that worked".
At this month's special
summit in Hampton
Court Europe's leaders
will discuss how to
maintain and strengthen
social justice and compe-
titiveness in the context
of globalisation, a sub-
ject which is now more widely discus-
sed than ever before – and not just by
politicians.
In this Policy Brief
1Iattempt to make
three points which may shed some
light on the current debate: 
First, the global economy of the 21st
century is characterised by rapid
changes, which create both threats
and opportunities. To take advantage
of the opportunities we must above all
reform labour market and social poli-
cies that are stuck in the past. Failure
to reform will not preserve the status
quo, but could even threaten both the
Single Market and monetary union.
Second, the notion of a single
“European Social Model” is largely
misleading. There are a number of dif-
ferent European social models with
different performances
in terms of “efficiency”
and “equity”. Models that
are not efficient are by
definition unsustainable
and must be reformed.
Third, labour market and
social policy reforms are
a matter for the Member
States alone, while other
necessary structural
reforms, such as the
completion of the Single Market for
services, are decided at the EU level.
There are undeniable benefits to be
had from coordinating action in a two-
handed strategy, especially for coun-
tries in the eurozone. This was preci-
sely the purpose of the Lisbon
Agenda, but it is rapidly failing. The
priority at the EU level should now be
geared to completing the Single
Market.
2. WHY REFORM?
The engine of change that is both dri-
ving the need to reform, and threate-
ning some of the past achievements
of the European economic system, is
fuelled by a heady mixture of techno-
logy and politics. The past 25 years
have seen the world economy make
rapid technological advances combi-
ned with political transformations
such as the adoption of market capi-
talism by China, India and the former
Soviet Bloc. One measure of the
change in global trade patterns is the
increase of the share of emerging
economies in manufactured product
markets long dominated by advan-
ced country suppliers. As recently as
1970, the share of developing coun-
tries in developed countries imports
of manufactured products was barely
10 per cent. Today, as Figure 2 shows,
their share is over 45 per cent.
Most of this phenomenal rise comes
from East Asia with China a late but
fast expanding entrant. China has
gone from a share of just 2 per cent at
the start of its economic transforma-
tion in 1985 to 15 per cent today and
has overtaken Japan as the EU’s
second largest supplier of manufac-
tures and of goods in general. The
emergence of developing countries
as major suppliers of manufactured
goods and services is only just star-
ting. In particular, developing Asia,
including India and China, is expected
to continue growing steadily at more
than 6 per cent per annum for at least
ageneration.
This rapid change in the global eco-
nomy creates both opportunities and
threats. The opportunities will fall to
those able to respond quickly with the
right technology and skills. This will
sometimes require the political cou-
rage to take action that hurts in the
short-term, but pays off in the long
run. The benefits associated with the
opportunities take time to materialise,
since they require investment in new
“The priority 
atthe EU level 
should now 
begeared to 
completing 
the Single 
Market.”
FIGURE 2 
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1This Brief is based 
onaBruegel paper 
prepared for 
apresentation to the
European Union’s
Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors
atthe ECOFIN informal
meeting in Manchester
on9September 2005.
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activities; the costs associated with
the threats are incurred more rapidly
since they derive from what we are
already doing. Postponing inevitable
changes is not a desirable option as it
would only delay the
benefits and increase the
costs. The challenge to
economic policy, there-
fore, is to conceive and
implement, as soon as
possible, economic and
social reforms aimed at
greater economic adap-
tability and better social
protection. 
3. EUROPEAN STATUS QUO
In Europe the needed reforms
concern above all a range of increa-
singly dysfunctional labour market
and social institutions established in
the 1950s and 1960s when the eco-
nomic environment was relatively
stable and predictable. Instead of fos-
tering the necessary adaptation and
flexible responses to increasingly
rapid changes, modern European wel-
fare states, which had helped fuel
economic and social progress during
the ‘trente glorieuses’ (the 30 years
between 1945 and 1975 when
Europe witnessed an unprecedented
period of growth, stability and social
cohesion), now often protect the sta-
tus quo. 
As Nobel Prize winner James
Heckman rightly states in his insight-
ful analysis of Europe, “The opportu-
nity cost of security and preservation
of the status quo – whether it is the
status quo technology, the status quo
trading partner, or the status quo job
– has risen greatly in recent times.”
(Heckman, 2002). 
During the past 25 years Europe has
not remained idle. Indeed recognition
of the need to improve Europe’s eco-
nomic performance in the face of glo-
balisation has driven much of EU eco-
nomic policy during the past two
decades. But important European
level institutional achievements such
as the Single Market Programme, the
sponsorship and sup-
port of R&D and mone-
tary union have failed to
generate greater eco-
nomic dynamism.
Progress towards the
completion of the Single
Market is too slow; the
EU budget remains a
relic of the past, alloca-
ting far too much to agri-
culture and too little to
research and innovation;
and economic stability
associated with monetary union has
not yet succeeded in generating addi-
tional growth. In fact, according to
most estimates, the EU’s
potential growth is now
only 2 per cent a year com-
pared with almost 3.5 per
cent in the United States
and 4 per cent for the
entire world. 
The simple but difficult
choice facing European
policy makers today is not
the black and white one of
preserving the status quo
versus abandoning the
cherished European Social
Model. It is instead a choice
of reforming national labour market
and social policies, or continuing to
hinder change.  In the first case the
two major economic achievements of
the EU in the last decade, the Single
Market, and the Euro, will be turned
into building blocks towards making
globalisation an opportunity. In the
second case not only will globalisa-
tion become a major threat, but both
the Single Market and the currency
union will increasingly be perceived
asthreats as well. 
Consider first the Single Market.
Transforming the enlarged European
Union of 27+ members into a genuine
Single Market, where goods, services,
capital and labour are allowed to
freely circulate, would offer great
opportunities to old and new Member
States alike. But this rosy scenario -
held by the European elites - where
everyone gains can only materialise
if national labour market and social
policies become more conducive to
changes in specialisation. This is
especially true in “Old Europe”, where
those losing their jobs in old activities
often find it difficult to obtain employ-
ment elsewhere. There, citizens often
tend to view enlargement as a zero-
sum game, where the gains for new
Member States come at the expense
of the old ones. 
The pan-European industrial reorgani-
sation needed to take advantage of
the opportunities
coming from enlar-
gement is too often
seen by the public
as a burden coming
on top of the weight
of global competi-
tion. A burden,
which not only
increases the threat
of delocalisation
and competition
from imports, but
also raises the
spectre of immigra-
tion, as seen in
fears about “Polish plumbers”. Since
enlargement is now a reality, the
backlash comes in terms of opposi-
tion to the Single Market itself. As the
debate over the services directive
has shown, by greatly increasing
economic and social disparities and
the pressure to restructure inside the
European Union, enlargement has
certainly complicated the goal of
completing the Single Market. Yet, the
Single Market not only constitutes
the keystone of European integration,
but also remains the most potent
European instrument to address the
challenge of globalisation.
“Postponing 
inevitable 
changes would 
only delay the 
benefits and 
increase 
the costs.”
“The Single 
Market is the 
most  potent
European 
instrument 
to address the 
challenge of 
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Dysfunctional labour market and
social policies are not only a threat
to the Single Market, but also endan-
ger the currency union. Any
European country is bound to suffer
from structural changes if its mar-
kets are inflexible and do not allow
the necessary transfer of resources
across firms, sectors
or regions. For mem-
bers of the eurozone,
market-led flexibility
is even more impor-
tant as they share a
common monetary
policy, which preclu-
des the use of the
exchange rate as an
instrument of change
– albeit an inade-
quate one. The lack of
appropriate market
mechanisms is bound to lead to
attempts to use fiscal policy as a
temporary remedy. However, such
attempts would not only conflict
with the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), but could even threaten its
survival. This threat could come
either from countries adopting
unsustainable fiscal positions, or
from public discontent over the cur-
rency union itself as a result of
unpopular measures taken to res-
pect the SGP.
Although the demise of the eurozone
or the exit of some of its members is
certainly not as close as some pro-
claim, the debate will continue to sur-
face as long as members remain pla-
gued by inflexible markets – particu-
larly labour markets – that prevent
them from making the necessary
economic adjustments.
4.THE FOUR EUROPEAN
SOCIAL MODELS  
Although they all share certain com-
mon values, there are so many diffe-
rences among national welfare state
systems that the very notions of a
“European Model” or “Social Europe”
are rather dubious at
least for analytical pur-
poses. I prefer to use
the now familiar grou-
ping
2 of national sys-
tems into four different
social policy models in
order to examine their
relative performance
along a number of
dimensions.
Nordic
3 countries fea-
ture the highest levels
of social protection expenditures and
universal welfare provision. There is
extensive fiscal intervention in labour
markets, and strong labour unions
ensure highly compressed wage
structures. 
Anglo-Saxon
4 countries feature relati-
vely large social assistance of the last
resort. Cash transfers are primarily
oriented to people in working age.
Active measures to help the unem-
ployed get jobs, and schemes that
link access to benefits to regular
employment are important. This
model is characterised by a mixture of
weak unions, comparatively high dis-
parities in wages and a relatively high
incidence of low pay. 
Continental
5 countries
rely extensively on insu-
rance-based benefits
and old-age pensions.
Although union member-
ship is in decline, the
unions remain strong. 
Finally,  Mediterranean
6 countries
concentrate their social spending on
old-age pensions – though there are
wide differences in both the degree of
entitlement and the amounts recei-
ved.  The social welfare systems typi-
cally draw on employment protection
and early retirement provisions, and
in the formal sector, the wage struc-
ture is covered by collective bargai-
ning and is highly compressed. 
Protection against uninsurable labour
market risk can either be provided by
employment protection legislation
(EPL), which protects workers
against firing, or by unemployment
benefits (UB)
7. The differences bet-
ween the two systems are clear:
legislation protects those who
already have a job and does not
impose any tax burden, whereas
benefits provide insurance to the
population at large and are typically
financed by a tax on those who work.
Since the two instruments are des-
igned to achieve a similar purpose
there is a clear trade-off between
them. Having a generous unemploy-
ment insurance system reduces the
need for restrictions against getting
fired, and vice versa.
The four European social policy
models behave very differently. The
Mediterranean model has generally
strict employment protection legisla-
tion (at least for permanent workers)
and a rather low coverage of unem-
ployment benefits. In contrast, the
Nordic model provides unemploy-
ment benefits that are generous and
comprehensive, but the strictness of
their EPL is quite low. The Continental
model also provides generous unem-
ployment benefits, but its
EPL is stricter. Finally, the
Anglo-Saxon model has
comparatively less
employment protection
legislation but as much
unemployment insu-
rance as the Continental
andNordic models.
Rewards for labour market participa-
tion vary a great deal across the four
models. Employment rates are far
higher in Nordic and Anglo-Saxon
“The debate over 
the eurozone
will continue 
to surface 
as long as 
markets remain
inflexible.”
“Rewards for 
labour market
participation 
vary a great 
deal.”
2This type 
of grouping used by
many economists 
is based on earlier 
work by
Esping-Andersen
(1990) characterising
welfare systems 
as “liberal”,
“conservative” or
“social democratic”.
3Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, plus the
Netherlands.
4Ireland and the United
Kingdom.
5Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany and
Luxembourg.
6Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain.
7See Boeri (2002)GLOBALISATION AND THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODELS
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countries (respectively 72% and 69%
in 2004) than in Continental and
Mediterranean countries (respecti-
vely 63% and 62%), with much of the
difference attributable to the two
ends of the age spectrum. The
Nordics and Anglo-Saxons are more
successful in keeping the employ-
ment rate for older workers high and
the unemployment rate for young
workers low.
This comparative analysis of the four
models can usefully be summarised
using two criteria: “efficiency” and
“equity”. For illustrative purposes a
model will be considered efficient if it
provides sufficient incentive to work,
therefore generating relatively high
employment rates. It will be deemed
equitable if it keeps the risk of
poverty relatively low. The Figure
above plots the probability of esca-
ping poverty against the employment
rate for the four country groupings
and each of the 15 members of the
old EU-15
8.
There is a strong connection between
the employment rate generated by a
social system and the instrument it
uses to protect workers from the
vagaries of the labour market. The
stricter the employment protection
legislation of a model, the lower its
employment rate. By contrast, the
generosity of unemployment bene-
fits only plays a secondary role. This
means that protecting jobs with
employment legislation is definitely
detrimental to employment, whereas
protecting workers with unemploy-
ment insurance is potentially useful
for employment.
All Nordic and Continental countries
rank above average in terms of the pro-
bability of avoiding poverty, while all
Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean coun-
tries rank below average. What
accounts for this difference? The
extent of redistribution via taxes and
transfers is important, but it cannot be
the major explanatory factor. A better
explanation is the difference in the dis-
tribution of human capital. The propor-
tion of the population aged 25-64 with
at least upper secondary education is
highest in “Nordic” (75%) and
“Continental” (67%) countries and
lowest in Anglo-Saxon (60%) and
Mediterranean (39%) – a ranking that
perfectly matches the position of coun-
try groups in terms of poverty risk.
The Table below compares the four
Models in terms of efficiency and
equity. 
This typology is the product of the
illustrative definition of “efficiency
and “equity” chosen here. Different
definitions might affect somewhat
the exact allocation of individual
countries but the typology itself
would broadly remain.
Examination of these models
prompts the following conclusions: 
lThe  “Mediterranean” model, 
characterised by relatively 
low levels of employment and 
ahigh risk of poverty, provides 
neither equity nor efficiency.
lWith the  “Anglo-Saxon” and 
“Continental” models there 
appears to be a trade-off 
between equity and efficiency.
lOnly the “Nordic” model, with 
high employment rates, and a
low risk of poverty combines 
both equity and efficiency.
Obviously equity has a price and
tends to be higher, therefore, in coun-
tries with relatively higher levels of
taxation. By contrast, efficiency
appears not to be related to levels of
taxation. What is perhaps the most
striking is the comparison of models
with the same level of equity but dif-
ferent levels of efficiency. The Nordic
model combines higher taxation (51%
8Figure 3 shows that
the four country 
groupings are far from
homogenous. Austria
seems to be more
“Nordic” than
“Continental”, and
Portugal more “Anglo-
Saxon” than
“Mediterranean”.
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EMPLOYMENT RATES AND PROBABILITY OF ESCAPING POVERTY
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of GDP in 2004, including social
contributions) and higher efficiency
than the Continental model (46%),
while the Anglo-Saxon model combi-
nes lower taxation (36%) and higher
efficiency than the Mediterranean
model (42%).  
Another reading of the last Table
(Figure 4) emphasises the sustaina-
bility of social models. Models that
are not efficient, and have the wrong
incentives to work, are simply not
sustainable in the face of growing
strains on public finances
coming from globalisation,
technological change and
population ageing. On the
other hand, models that are
not equitable may be sustai-
nable. 
In the current historical
phase, the case for reform is
therefore strongest, in the
Continental and Mediterranean
countries where the welfare
state has become highly inef-
ficient. By relying on strict
employment protection laws
it discourages adaptation to
change and preserves the status quo.
The system therefore reduces overall
employment and raises unemploy-
ment. For a long time “median voters”
were largely spared from growing
unemployment – the burden falling
mainly on the young and immigrants,
while older workers exited the labour
market mainly through generous
early retirement schemes. Today,
however, the political equilibrium has
changed. Median voters are no longer
insulated from the ever-growing pres-
sure of globalisation and also realise
that the combination of population
ageing and low employment rates
jeopardises their future pension
benefits.
There is no reason a priori to assume
that such reform must go hand-in-
hand with changes in terms of equity.
It is perfectly possible for the
Continental model to become more
like the Nordic one and for the
Mediterranean model to become
more like the Anglo-Saxon model.
Nonetheless, one cannot reject the
possibility that a reform towards
greater efficiency may also unleash a
change towards more or less equity.
The message, however, is not that the
Continental and Mediterranean
models are going to disappear and
that only the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon
models will survive. It is simply that
the former must
reform in order to
become more effi-
cient, probably by
adopting some fea-
tures of the latter. 
Reforms of the
Continental and
Mediterranean
countries are crucial
not only for them-
selves. The reason is
simple arithmetic –
their combined GDP
accounts for two-
thirds that of the
entire EU-25 and 90 per cent of the 12-
member eurozone. The economic and
social health of these countries is the-
refore of paramount importance for
the smooth functioning of the entire
European Union and of the eurozone.
5. POLICY CHALLENGES
Since countries with inadequate
labour market and social policies
account for such a large proportion of
EU and eurozone GDP, the question
arises as to what can and should
“Europe” do to help promote the
necessary reforms. As shown in the
Table
8 (right), in the microeconomic
sphere, labour market regulation is
largely decided at national level, whe-
reas the EU level deals mostly with
product and capital market regula-
tion. In the macroeconomic sphere,
the Member States are responsible
for fiscal policy, but monetary policy
for the eurozone is managed by the
European Central Bank (ECB).
The question about the potential role
of Europe in the process of reforming
national labour markets raises seve-
ral questions about coordination:
lShould labour market reforms
among EU countries be 
coordinated?
lIs there a case for coordinating
labour market reforms with
reforms of product and capital 
market regulation?
lFor eurozone countries, is 
there a case for coordinating 
structural reform and 
macroeconomic policy?
Despite commitments to coordinate
employment policies at the European
level, the fact of the matter is, labour
market and social reforms need to be
conceived and engineered by each
Member State according to its own
economic, social and political reality.
To the extent that it clearly and solely
focuses on benchmarking and
exchange of best practices, coordina-
tion can be useful. Beyond that, coor-
dination of labour market and social
policies is probably an obstacle rather
FIGURE 5 
ASSIGNMENT OF ECONOMIC
POLICIES IN THE EU SYSTEM
Monetary 
Policy
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Regulation
Labour Market
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“There is no
reason 
apriori to
assume that
such reform
must go
hand-in-hand
with changes
in terms 
of equity.”
8Taken from von
Hagen and Pisani-Ferry
(2002) but originally
suggested by
Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa.GLOBALISATION AND THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODELS
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than a catalyst for reform, because it
tends to blur the responsibility bet-
ween national and EU authorities.
Placing responsibility
where power lies is cru-
cial for good functio-
ning of the EU system.
The failure to do so has
resulted in the public
becoming utterly
confused about who is
responsible for what –
a sure recipe for voter
dissatisfaction. This is
not to deny however
that some labour mar-
ket and social policies
(such as those concer-
ning migration) must be handled at
the EU level.
So far the concentration in this
Policy Brief has been solely on
labour market reforms. Yet it is well
known that the structure of product
and capital markets affects the per-
formance of the labour market and
vice versa. Reforms of product and
capital markets tend to increase the
demand for labour and thereby ease
the pain of labour market reforms.
Reforms of labour markets encou-
rage new firms, thereby assisting
reforms of product and capital mar-
kets. For an individual country to
take advantage of this potentially
virtuous circle makes economic
sense. But the positive effect of
such coordination would be streng-
thened still further if Member States,
who share the Single Market, were to
coordinate reforms.  
There are two ways of solving the
chicken-and-egg problem between
product and capital market reforms
at the EU level on the one hand, and
reforms in national labour markets
on the other. One is to concentrate
all energy on the EU level, secure
product market and capital market
liberalisation, and hope that this will
eventually trigger labour market
reforms through some “TINA” (There
Is No Alternative) process. The other
is to act simultaneously at both
levels. The advantage of the second
solution is that it
would, in principle, be
more efficient and less
painful, as labour mar-
ket reforms would
benefit from product
and capital market
reforms, and vice
versa. The Lisbon
Agenda can be viewed
as an attempt to solve
this “coordination fai-
lure” between EU and
national reforms.
Unfortunately, Lisbon
has not delivered.
The lack of interest displayed by EU
countries in coordinating their struc-
tural reforms via the Lisbon process
may be due to uncertainty concer-
ning the extent of the spillover bene-
fits generated by reforms in other
Member States, as a result of the
Single Market. There is, however, a
subset of EU Member States for
which spillovers, and therefore the
case for coordination, are undenia-
ble.  To the extent that structural
reforms in one eurozone country
affect the average inflation rate of
the zone, there is a case for coordi-
nating structural reforms since they
affect the common
interest rate. 
As Jean Pisani-Ferry
(2005) argues, the
case for coordination is
especially important
when it comes to
implementing reforms
that are costly in the
short term. Labour
market reforms may
increase unemployment before they
lower it, because they create anxiety
and lead firms to shed redundant
labour faster than they create new
jobs. Product market reforms may
also depress growth because the
losses by incumbents are imme-
diate while new entities take time to
develop and grow. This is why
reform is easier when accompanied
by monetary expansion and fiscal
relaxation.
For understandable reasons the ECB
is unwilling to engage in formal coor-
dination with governments and to
cut interest rates ahead of structu-
ral reforms. Members of the euro-
zone, therefore, need to act first.
Coordinated structural reform by the
main players in the eurozone would
be a powerful signal to the ECB. It is
also essential for the countries of
the eurozone where progress with
structural reform has been particu-
larly slow.
Summing up, Europe cannot and
should not have a strategy for refor-
ming national labour market and
social policies. It is up to each natio-
nal government to devise its own
strategy.
Yet, a two-handed approach, combi-
ning product and capital market
reform at the EU level with labour
market and social policy reform at
the national level would be superior to
astrategy seeking to reform national
labour and social policies alone, espe-
cially for the countries in the euro-
zone.
The Lisbon Strategy
was an attempt to
implement this kind of
two-handed approach,
but the Lisbon method
was simply too weak
to deliver. Five years
after its launch in
2000, it has delivered
neither a major thrust
towards completing the Single
Market nor significant labour mar-
ket reforms. 
“Labour 
market and
social reforms
need to be
conceived and
engineered by
each Member
State.”
“Labour 
market reforms
may increase
unemployment
before they
lower it.”GLOBALISATION AND THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODELS
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6.WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Atthis stage, the best strategy would
be to go back to basics and focus all
efforts at the EU level on completing
the Single Market.
The single market and an active com-
petition policy are the cornerstone of
efforts at the EU level to improve the
functioning of markets, and thereby,
Europe’s capability to respond to the
challenges of globa-
lisation and techno-
logical change. 
By removing barriers
to the mobility of
products and capital
and by fostering com-
petition, the Single
Market Programme
(SMP) was expected
to raise productivity,
employment and
growth in the European Union. Yet,
growth has been mediocre, with
Europe’s performance deteriorating
both absolutely and in comparison to
the United States during the past 20
years since the launch of the SMP.
Besides German reunification and
other shocks, there are three main
reasons for this.
First the SMP was never fully imple-
mented. Since 1993, the Single
Market has been a reality for goods,
but service markets, including finan-
cial markets, remain highly fragmen-
ted. Yet the efficient provision of ser-
vices - which account for about 70
per cent of European economic acti-
vity and offer the greatest opportuni-
ties for employment growth - is cru-
cial for a modern economy. 
Second, the conception and imple-
mentation of the SMP were rooted in
yesterday’s thinking. They were based
on the assumption that Europe’s fun-
damental problem was the absence of
a large internal market that would
allow companies to achieve big eco-
nomies of scale. It has now become
clear that the problem lay elsewhere.
In the modern world, what European
industry needs is more opportunity
to enter new markets, more retrai-
ning of labour, grea-
ter reliance on mar-
ket financing, and
higher investment in
both research and
development and
higher education.
Third,the SMP natu-
rally excluded the
liberalisation of
labour markets, since
this falls within the
competence of the Member States.
Yet, without such reform and greater
labour mobility within and across
companies, the liberalisation of mar-
kets was unlikely to trigger the reallo-
cation of resources necessary to pro-
duce higher growth.
Following the rejection in March 2005
by the European Council of the servi-
ces directive tabled by the
Commission in January, the creation
of a single market for services – a
crucial component of the Lisbon
Agenda - remains uncertain at best. 
This lack of progress on services is
bad news for the competitiveness of
the European manufacturing sector,
which is more and more intertwined
with the provision of modern and
flexible services. Additionally, as the
discussion about the “Polish plum-
ber” demonstrates, the stalling of
progress on services illustrates the
fundamental tension between the
goals of creating a genuine single
market among 27+ countries with
vast economic and social disparities,
while at the same time preserving
the “European Social Model”.
It is not the Single Market that threa-
tens the “European Social Model”, but
the inability to reform that model, or
some of its incarnations, in the face of
rapid global changes. With or without
the services directive, the rise of
manufacturing in China and the exo-
dus of back-office services to India
are inevitable. With or without it, the
addition of 12 new Member States is
bound to affect the services market
either in the open or in shadow.
Completing the integration of the 27-
plus economies of the European
Union must be the utmost priority of
efforts at EU level to revitalise the
European Economy. But Member
States must also carry out parallel
reforms of national labour market
and social policies that are geared
towards improving the capacity of
their economies and citizens.
Poised at this new crossroads in
Europe’s economic history, policy
makers must choose the path of
reform at both EU and national levels.
Only then will we be able to reap the
opportunities offered by globalisation
and technological change, and fulfil
the promise of the Single Market and
monetary union.
“The conception
and implementation
of the Single Market
Programme were
rooted in yesterday’s
thinking.”
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